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UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AFTER IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.
v. EASTMAN KODAK CO.

Brian F. Ladenburg
Abstract: While the Federal Patent and Copyright Acts give patent and copyright holders
limited exclusive rights in intellectual property, the Sherman Act prohibits combinations or
conspiracies that restrain trade and monopolization. Although firms possessing intellectual
property generally exercise their statutory exclusionary rights without running afoul of the
antitrust laws, conduct may plausibly be authorized by intellectual property law but forbidden
by antitrust. In construing the two statutory schemes, federal courts have generally held that
conduct authorized by the intellectual property laws, in the absence of some further
inculpatory action, cannot form the basis for antitrust liability. The Ninth Circuit departed
from this trend in the recent opinion of Image TechnicalServices, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
holding that a unilateral refusal to deal in patented and copyrighted material can alone
constitute sufficiently exclusionary conduct to state a section 2 Sherman Act claim for
monopolization or attempted monopolization. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit ignored
relevant precedent and crafted a test that offers little practical guidance on the limits of a
patent or copyright holder's exclusionary powers in the context of a Sherman Act section 2
claim. This Note argues that, while the Ninth Circuit reached the correct conclusion in this
case, the court's broad test insufficiently protects holders of intellectual property from
antitrust attack for exercising their statutorily-authorized exclusive rights, and offers no
compelling tangible benefit to consumers.

The federal antitrust and intellectual property laws claim to embrace
the same broad policies of encouraging the development and marketing
of novel products in a competitive marketplace; yet, in practice the two
statutory schemes are sometimes in tension. Section 2 of the Sherman
Act forbids monopolization and attempted monopolization,' while the
Patent and Copyright Acts confer property rights that allow their holders
to exclude others from either using, making, selling,2 or reproducing and
distributing3 protected items or works for a statutorily-designated period.
In most situations, those holding patents or copyrights can conduct their
business without fear of running afoul of the Sherman Act.4
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
2. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
3. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1998).
4. Because the Sherman Act is also concerned with such things as concerted action and tying
arrangements, and the intellectual property laws merely grant a limited right to engage in
exclusionary conduct, holders of intellectual property can often conduct their business without fear
of running afoul of the federal antitrust laws. For example, section I of the Sherman Act condemns
combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, which can include tying arrangements and price
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However, when the specific conduct that federal intellectual property

law authorizes would raise antitrust concerns in the absence of copyright
or patent protection, courts must harmonize the conflicting statutory
schemes. Recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed such a problem in Image
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak II).' The court
concluded that a firm's unilateral refusal to deal 6 in intellectual property
constitutes exclusionary conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits monopolization and attempted monopolization.7
The Kodak II court decision, heard after remand, builds on the U.S.
Supreme Court's well-known holding in the same case (Kodak I) that
markets may be defined in a finn-specific manner for purposes of section
2 analysis.8 The Kodak I court found Kodak's intellectual property
rights in its copyrighted diagnostic software and patented replacement
parts to be insufficient business justifications for its exclusionary conduct
in refusing to deal with downstream, aftermarket competitors.9 The Ninth
Circuit held, in a case of first impression, that behavior expressly
authorized by the intellectual property statutes can alone constitute
exclusionary conduct sufficient to sustain a Sherman Act section 2 claim
for monopolization or attempted monopolization."
This Note argues that by subjecting a firm to a Sherman Act section 2
claim because of the very exclusionary conduct authorized by the
intellectual property laws, the Ninth Circuit has deviated from a pattern
of more sensible antitrust deferral to patent and copyright law in cases
where antitrust forbids that which patent and copyright expressly permit.
fixing. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 250-52
(1982). These antitrust concerns do not pose as great a risk of direct conflict with the intellectual
property laws as section 2 of the Sherman Act, which potentially implicates a single firm.
5. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) [Kodak II], cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998).
6. Courts have applied the term "unilateral refusal to deal" to the conduct of a firm that, by its
own volition and in the absence of a conspiracy among others, simply refuses to deal with a
competitor or customer. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. The term is used chiefly as a
means of distinguishing between unilateral conduct and concerted conduct. Refusals to deal by
multiple market participants are generally referred to as "group boycotts," and are often evaluated
under section 1 of the Sherman Act as illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. See
infra note 14.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
8. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,481-82 (1992) [Kodak ].
9. KodaklH, 125 F.3d at 1218.
10. Id. Many courts have imposed antitrust scrutiny and liability on conduct involving intellectual
property; however, the Kodak II court was the first to find a violation in the absence of some
additional inculpatory conduct not authorized by the intellectual property laws. See infra text
accompanying note 76.
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This deviation threatens to undermine the delicate balance the
intellectual property laws have struck between competing public policy
demands on intellectual property." The rebuttable presumption test the
Ninth Circuit adopts 2 emasculates the property rights conferred by the
intellectual property laws by introducing a novel intent consideration into
intellectual property law analysis. The test effectively treats conduct
involving protected intellectual property in the same way that antitrust
law treats all other conduct in the context of section 2 monopolization
claims. The result weakens the protections afforded patent and copyright
holders; in turn, this may threaten to diminish the incentives to disclose
inventions and ideas that underlie intellectual property law.
Part I of this Note examines the underlying statutory and case law that
preceded the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Kodak 1I. Part II discusses the
Ninth Circuit's opinion and explains that the court deviates from prior
federal and Ninth Circuit cases by subjecting to antitrust scrutiny the
very exclusionary conduct normally sanctioned by the intellectual
property laws. Part III argues that the Ninth Circuit's new test, while
billed as a carefully-crafted compromise, actually strips the intellectual
property laws of their power by jeopardizing a concrete, affirmative right
to exclude with a loose "rebuttable presumption" test for reasonableness.
This Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit's new test serves no
compelling antitrust purpose; yet, it risks jeopardizing the intellectual
property laws' effectiveness by undermining the policies underlying the
federal patent and copyright systems.
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

Federal courts have often been forced to reconcile the apparently
competing demands of antitrust and intellectual property law. While both
statutory schemes reflect a broad policy aimed at achieving a robust and
competitive marketplace, the means employed to achieve that goal differ
significantly. Antitrust law strives for efficiency and consumer welfare
and forbids marketplace conduct, whether perpetrated by one or many
firms, that leads to inefficiency or harms consumer welfare. 3 Among the
11. For a discussion of the competing public policy interests the Patent and Copyright Acts seek
to balance, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
12. See Kodak 11, 125 F.3d at 1218.
13. See generally Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993) (discussing
broad purpose of Sherman Act: to protect competition, not competitors).
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many activities antitrust law may forbid-price fixing, price
discrimination, group boycotts, and geographic market-division
agreements, for example-monopolization poses the greatest risk of
direct conflict with intellectual property law. The problem arises from
the law's conflicting treatment of exclusivity. On one hand, antitrust law
forbids a firm from obtaining exclusive or near-exclusive control of a
market. On the other hand, the holder of intellectual property possesses
the exclusive right to exploit the patented or copyrighted product. When
the product protected by intellectual property law constitutes its own
allegedly monopolized antitrust market, courts must resolve a direct
conflict between the statutes. The Ninth Circuit in Kodak II faced such a
problem and construed the two statutory schemes in deviation from
precedent and in contravention of the underlying policies justifying both
antitrust and intellectual property law. An explanation of antitrust and
intellectual property laws helps to demonstrate the trouble with the Ninth
Circuit's approach.
A.

Antitrust Laws

1.

Monopolization andAttempted Monopolization Under the Sherman Act

Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids monopolization and attempted
monopolization, whether perpetrated by unilateral or concerted action. 4
In United States v. Grinnell Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a

14. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
The distinction between unilateral and concerted action is crucial. Unilateral conduct is conduct by
one firm or market participant, while concerted action and conspiracies necessarily involve the
coordinated action of many firms. Concerted refusals to deal, often referred to as "group boycotts,"
have long been illegal, usually under section 1 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Indus., 610 F.2d 1059, 1072-73 (3d Cir. 1979); Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc., 538
F.2d 134, 138-45 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 199 (E.D. Pa. 1956),
aff'dper curiam, 355 U.S. 5 (1957). A unilateral refusal to deal, however, must be analyzed under
the stricter standards of a section 2 monopolization or attempted monopolization claim. This analysis
requires a factual inquiry into the degree of market power and the exclusionary practices of the
defendant. See infra text accompanying note 16.
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general two-prong test for liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act."
A prima facie monopolization case requires (1) possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market by the alleged monopolist, and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident. 6 The second prong, referred to as the
"conduct element," requires a showing that the firm with monopoly
power uses that power to foreclose competition, gain a competitive
advantage, or destroy competition. 7 To establish an attempted
monopolization claim, the plaintiff must show (1) a specific intent to
control prices or destroy competition, (2) predatory or anticompetitive
conduct directed at accomplishing that purpose, (3) a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power, and (4) causal antitrust
injury.' In sum, a prima facie case of monopolization or attempted
monopolization requires a plaintiff to show both market or monopoly
power and exclusionary conduct indicative of an intent to monopolize.
2.

Refusals to Dealas Exclusionary Conduct UnderSection 2

While the Sherman Act generally imposes no duty to deal with
competitors, 9 it prohibits unilateral refusals to deal by firms with
monopoly power when no legitimate business reasons can explain the
refusal because such conduct betrays an intent to monopolize. The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged such a duty to deal with competitors in
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., which held that one
dominant ski resort's unilateral decision to terminate an agreement with
its competitor to offer an "all Aspen" ski pass could constitute
exclusionary conduct sufficient to state a section 2 claim.2" The Court
stressed that the right to select customers and associates is not
15. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
16. Id. at570-71.
17. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,482-83 (1992)).
18. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
19. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985)
("[E]ven a firm with monopoly power has no general duty to engage in a joint marketing program
with a competitor."); accordUnited States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Mutual Fund
Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 1977); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. CX Processing Lab., Inc., 523 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1975); Robert Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox344 (1978) ("Present law leaves the individual firm free to refuse to deal with others ... .
20. 472 U.S. at 585.
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unqualified,2 and that a refusal to deal may trigger liability if motivated
by an intent to monopolize.22 Consequently, a firm with monopoly power
may refuse to deal only when the refusal is supported by a legitimate
business justification.23
Sometimes the monopolist bears the burden of establishing the
legitimacy of its business justifications as an affirmative defense
subsequent to a prima facie showing of exclusionary conduct.24 In
evaluating the termination of the area ski-pass agreement under section
2, the Aspen Court characterized the decision to terminate the agreement
as a monopolist's decision to make an important change in the nature of
the marketplace in a manner that upsets established, and presumptively
efficient, patterns.2 While this observation was not central to the Court's
holding, it was a factor in the Court's decision to uphold section 2
liability in the absence of a legitimate business reason for the refusal.26
The Court reasoned that a firm's deviation from an established (and
hence presumptively competitive and efficient) pattern suggests that the
underlying reasons for the change may not be procompetitive and
beneficial to the consumer. 27 After Aspen, a monopolist's 2' unilateral
refusal to deal with competitors is legal only if valid business reasons
justify its actions. 29 Following Aspen, a prima facie showing of a section
2 violation by a firm that unilaterally refuses to deal can be rebutted with
a showing that the conduct was motivated by legitimate business

21. Id. (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951) (holding that
magazine publisher's refusal to sell advertising to businesses that advertised with competitor
violated section 2)).
22. Id. at 602-03.
23. Id. at 604-05, 608-10 (discussing proffered business justifications of ski resort in terminating
joint ticket agreement with its competitor).
24. Infra note 30 and accompanying text.
25. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 604.
26. Id.
27. While the Court recognized that the decision to change an established pattern is not
necessarily exclusionary conduct per se, the procedural posture of the case-before the court on a
summary judgment appeal-required it to view all facts in the light most favorable to Aspen
Highlands. Id.
28. Any section 2 claim must establish monopoly power and intent to monopolize. As this Note is
chiefly concerned with the second of these elements, the remaining discussion will assume the ready
establishment of monopoly power. See supratext accompanying note 16.
29. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451. 483 (1992) ("Liability
turns, then, on whether 'valid business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions.").
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justifications. 0 Courts have refrained from establishing rote formulae for
analyzing the legitimacy of business justifications, instead engaging in
case-by-case basis evaluations when examining proffered business
justifications.3
Notably, the disputes in the line of cases culminating in Aspen that
forged the legitimate-business-justification defense did not involve
refusals to deal in intellectual property.32 Consequently, the courts that
developed this test for evaluating unilateral refusals to deal did not weigh
the countervailing interests that arise when the products a firm refuses to
deal to competitors are also protected by intellectual property law.
3.

Public Policy andEconomic Concerns ofAntitrust

Antitrust law seeks to achieve efficient allocation of resources by
securing and maintaining a competitive marketplace. The Sherman Act
seeks to protect competition, not competitors.33 Recognizing the danger
that a monopolist will restrict output to suboptimal levels and raise
prices, section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids monopolization or attempted
monopolization.34 As noted above, the two-pronged test for liability
under section 2 is designed to distinguish between firms that achieve
their dominant market position on merit and those that do so through
anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct.3"
Section 2 of the Sherman Act reflects Congress's judgment that
scrutiny of the conduct of single firms is only appropriate when it
presents a significant danger of monopolization, and evaluating unilateral
conduct under this lenient standard ensures that antitrust laws will not
dampen efforts of a single aggressive entrepreneur.3 6 Hence, courts have
30. See. e.g., id.; High Tech. Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987, 990 (9th Cir.
1993); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 368 (9thCir. 1988).
31. Given the highly fact-intensive nature of the inquiry into the reasonableness of a firm's
practices, coupled with the immense variety of fact patterns that may arise, this approach makes
sense. See generally Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183-84 (Ist
Cir. 1994) (suggesting that Aspen cast doubt on proposition that any single rule or formula will
determine legality of refusal to deal).
32. See Aspen, 472 U.S. 585 (involving refusals to deal in ski lift tickets); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (involving refusal to sell wholesale electricity); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States. 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (involving refusal to sell advertising in magazine).
33. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488 (1977) (citations omitted).
34. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
35. Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
36. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
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been more reluctant to impose liability under the Sherman Act to one
firm acting alone than to several firms acting in concert-a scenario
inherently "fraught with anticompetitive risk., 37 Because "without
bounds, claims based on unilateral conduct will proliferate,"3 a prima
facie case under section 2 requires proof of monopoly power and intent
to monopolize described above.3 9 This can nevertheless be rebutted upon
a showing that the challenged conduct is supported by a legitimate
business justification.4" The high burden required to prevail on a section
2 claim reflects the policy of the Sherman Act to protect consumers and
competition, not individual competitors.
B.

IntellectualPropertyLaw

1.

Affirmative Rights to Exclude in the Patentand CopyrightActs

The federal Patent Act 4 and Copyright Act 42 confer on patent and
copyright holders analogous rights to exclude others from exploiting
protected work.43 While the statutes differ significantly on the nature of
the protections afforded,44 both statues confer a property right that
expressly authorizes their owners to exclude others from exploiting their
products.45 While the property rights these statutes grant are sometimes
confusingly labeled "monopolies," 46 to avoid confusion this Note simply
37. Id. at 768-69.
38. Image Tech Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998).
39. Supra text accompanying note 16.
40. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
42. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1998).
43. The Patent Act provides:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if
the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). The Copyright Act lists the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders. 17
U.S.C.A. § 106(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1998).
44. Philip Areeda & Donald TumerAntitnstT 711, at 201-02 (1996).

45. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106; 35 U.S.C. § 154.
46. See, e.g., Axis S.p.A. v. Micafil, Inc., 870 F.2d 1105, 1111 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Patent laws grant
a monopoly for a limited time.... Thus, a lawfully acquired patent creates a monopoly that does not
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refers to the rights expressly authorized by these statues as the "patent
grant" or the "copyright grant."47 These intellectual property laws impose
no duty upon their holder to use or practice the protected invention or
idea;4" rather, they merely vest their holder with the property right to
exclude others from that privilege for a limited period of time.49
2.

Public Policy Considerationsand Economic Justificationsfor
GrantingIntellectualPropertyProtection

The Patent and Copyright Acts address problems unique to intellectual
property. Unlike real or personal property, ideas-whether the creative
ideas of authors that copyright law protects or the useful, non-obvious
inventions that patent law protects-are intangible.5 0 This intangibility
presents two closely related problems: "inappropriability and
indivisibility."'" Both derive from the free replicability of ideas at low or
no cost.
Authors and inventors who have labored to produce their works,
knowing that others may copy the works and sell them at a fraction of the
violate the antitrust laws."); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (referring to copyright owner's "legal monopoly" over copyrighted material).
47. In refraining from referring to a "patent monopoly," one avoids confusing an economic
conclusion in antitrust law with a statutorily-authorized property right in patent and copyright law.
This distinction is nothing new. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,
221 (1980) ("The boundary of a patent monopoly is to be limited by the literal scope of the patent
claims."); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1160 n.8 (6th Cir. 1978)
("The loose application of the pejorative term 'monopoly' to the property right of exclusion
represented by a patent, can be misleading. Unchecked it can destroy the constitutional and statutory
scheme reflected in the patent system."). See generally In re Independent Servs. Org. Antitrust Litig.,
989 F. Supp. 113 1, 1133-36 (D. Kan. 1997).
48. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 179 (1931); United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
See generally Areeda & Turner, supra note 44, at 186. The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988
reinforced this by stating that no patent holder shall be deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension
of the patent grant by refusing to license or use any of the rights of the patent. Pub. L. No. 100-703,
102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)(1994)). It is also well established that
copyright holders may lawfully refuse to exploit their copyright grant. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (holding that copyright owner "may refrain from vending or licensing and
content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his property").
49. Supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
50. For convenience this Note uses the generic term "idea" to refer to material that is capable of
being patented or copyrighted. Strictly speaking, it is not the idea that intellectual property law
protects, but the utilization of the idea (in the case of patent) or the expression of the idea (in the case
of copyright).
51. Paul Goldstein, Copyright § 1.14.1, at 1:44-45 (2d ed. 1996).
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cost, will not waste the effort producing intellectual property for want of
a means of reaping profit for their labors. This is the problem of
"inappropriability" or "free riding."52 Its central assumption is that
without some artificial protection, too few resources will be devoted to
innovation and creative activity.
Meanwhile, the ease and low cost of replicating ideas offers the public
a unique asset: widespread access. Given the low cost of replication,
access to ideas, unlike tangible property, has no natural limits imposed
by scarcity. 3 Consequently, the public benefits by enjoying the easily
reproduced and widely distributed information. A benefit to one person
need not deprive another of the same benefit.
The Patent and Copyright Acts are an attempt to alleviate the tension
between these competing concerns by granting short-term exclusive
rights to the producers of intellectual property in exchange for disclosure
to the public. This ideally "promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."54 The goal
of copyright is to encourage the widest possible production and
dissemination of literary and artistic works.55 Similarly, the goal of patent
is to encourage disclosure of inventions that promote the progress of
science and useful arts. The Copyright and Patent Acts reflect a
legislative balancing that targets the dilemma "that without a legal
monopoly not enough information will be produced but with the legal
monopoly too little of the information will be used."56 The exclusive
rights granted ameliorate the problem of inappropriability by securing to
the property holder a means of profiting. Meanwhile, the limited nature
and duration of the exclusive rights mitigate the threat of
underproduction of ideas.5

52. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law 2 (1976); Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen,
Law and Economics 134-35 (1988).
53. For example, while the paper in books is a finite and exhaustible resource, the words and
paragraphs that fill the pages have no analogous natural limit.
54. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. S.
55. Goldstein, supranote 5 1, § 1.14, at 1:40; see also Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (discussing policies of copyright); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (same).
56. Cooter & Ulen, supranote 52, at 135.
57. The decision to grant exclusive rights implies suboptimal production during the term of the
patent or copyright grant. Exclusive control of production encourages restricted output at higher
prices. See Bowman, supra note 52, at 17.
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Although scholars have debated the merits of these theoretical
justifications for the intellectual property laws, it is important for policy
purposes to recognize that the incentives the Patent and Copyright Acts
offer take the form of discretionary powers of exclusion. From a broad
economic perspective, the exact form of the inducement may not matter.
But, from the perspective of individuals seeking protection, these powers
to exclude are the sole incentives offered for public disclosure of
innovation and creativity aside from the marketplace, which offers no
natural solution to the problems of inappropriability and indivisibility.
When weighing the competing demands incident to intellectual property
and formulating this system as a solution, Congress found that the shortterm costs of issuing exclusionary rights are justified by the long-range
benefits that society reaps from the induced disclosure. While the
requirements for protection differ, neither the Patent Act nor the
Copyright Act weighs or considers the intentions of the author or
inventor in assessing worthiness for protection."8
C.

Section 2 Claims and IntellectualPropertyLaws: The Needfor
Unique Treatment of Conduct Involving IntellectualProperty

The Kodak case was not the first to address what the Ninth Circuit has
deemed an "obvious tension" between the antitrust and intellectual
property laws.59 The cases that construe federal antitrust and intellectual
property law fall into two broad groups. One line of cases deals with
firms that have been subject to antitrust liability under the Sherman Act
for misusing a patent,60 using a fraudulently procured patent,61 or
extending the reach of the patent "beyond the patent grant. ' 6 The second
line of cases involves firms whose conduct survived antitrust challenge
because it was expressly authorized by the patent or copyright statute and
consequently shielded from antitrust scrutiny.63 In the former, antitrust
58. Indeed, patent and copyright holders can legally sit on their respective exclusive rights,
irrespective of motive. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432-33, modified by
324 U.S. 570 (1945) (patent); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123. 127 (1932) (copyright).
Theoretically, everyone who meets the statutory requirements for issuance could secure a patent
or copyright.
59. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1981).
60. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
61. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1208-09 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,665 (1943).
63. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1206 ("[W]here a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent
conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws.").
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liability is imposed for conduct that is illegal under established doctrines
of intellectual property law: misuse, fraud, and illegal extension beyond
the scope of the patent grant. In the latter, practices authorized by
intellectual property law survive antitrust challenge based, at least partly,
on allegations that practicing the patent or copyright constitutes
actionable conduct under section 2.
1.

PatentMisuse, FraudulentProcurement,and IllegalExtension of
the PatentGrant

The equitable doctrine of patent misuse is an affirmative defense to a
claim for patent infringement. 64 There can be no independent cause of
action for misuse; it can only be asserted as a defense to an infringement
claim. The relationship between this doctrine and the antitrust laws is
complex.65 If a practice constitutes an antitrust violation, it will also
constitute misuse.66 However, misuse will only sometimes constitute an
antitrust violation.6 7
The case law on misuse is not entirely coherent regarding what
constitutes misuse. Courts sometimes adhere to a vague concept of
"extension" when analyzing whether a particular practice is misuse.6" In
dealing with misuse claims, courts ask if the conduct illegally "extends"
the patent beyond the terms of its grant. Many of these cases involve
infringement claims with antitrust counterclaims.6 9
In 1988, Congress passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act.7" The
amendments specified that no firm shall be deemed guilty of misuse or
64. United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); see also
William C. Holmes, Intellectual Propertyand Antitrust Law § 1.07, at 1-43 (1998).
65. Donald Chisum, Patents§ 19.04[2J, at 19-298 (1992).
66. Id. at 19-300.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garret Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir.
1943). The concept of extension, usually found in tying cases, arises when the patentee attempts to
extend the patent's exclusionary powers beyond the scope of the patent grant. See Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (distinguishing proper use of
patent, which is permissible under antitrust analysis, and improper extension, which may trigger
antitrust liability if sufficient market power is present).
69. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp., 897 F.2d 1572. See generallyRichard Calkins, PatentLaw: The
Impact of the 1988 PatentMisuse Reform Act and Noerr-PenningtonDoctrine on Misuse Defenses
and Antitrust Counterclaims,38 Drake L. Rev. 175, 201-02 (1989).
70. Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-

(5) (1994)).
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illegal extension of the patent right by refusing to license or use fights in
a patent.7 ' The legislative history indicates that the amendment was
passed to codify the then-existing rule that a refusal to use or license a
patent did not constitute misuse.72 More importantly, the Act indicated
Congress's affirmative judgment that antitrust principles should be used
to determine the legality of alleged misuse.73 In particular, the Act allows
patent holders to refuse to license or use their patents and to condition
licensing on acquisition of rights in another patent unless the patent
owner has market power in the relevant market.74 While the amendment
only speaks to whether certain patent practices constitute misuse (and
remains silent on which acts of misuse rise to the level of Sherman Act
violations), it nevertheless indicates that Congress at least seeks some
75
consistency in evaluating misuse defenses and antitrust counterclaims.
The amendment also implicitly acknowledges, and attempts to address,
that intellectual property holders pose unique problems for antitrust
analysis, problems that antitrust principles alone cannot readily handle.
2.

Antitrust Claims Based on Conduct Expressly Authorized by the
IntellectualPropertyLaws

The leading case on the antitrust treatment of patent holders who only
engage in anticompetitive conduct expressly authorized by the
intellectual property laws is SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.76 This court held
that when patents are lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible
under the patent laws cannot trigger antitrust liability.77 SCM Corp.
involved a unilateral refusal to license patents, a situation similar to the
fact pattern in Kodak I. 78 The Second Circuit adopted a blanket
71. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).
72. 134 Cong. Rec. H32,295 (1988).
73. For example, the Act added 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5), which specifically exempts certain
licensing practices from the misuse doctrine unless the patent owner possesses market power in the
market for the patent or patented product. § 201, 102 Stat. at 4676.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5).
75. 134 Cong. Rec. H32,295.
76. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
77. Id. at 1206.
78. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1560 (1998) (describing Kodak's refusal to sell parts to ISOs). An important
distinction should be noted between a unilateral refusal to deal in patents or copyrights (a refusal to
license or sell the patent or copyright itself) and a unilateral refusal to deal in the products covered
by the patent or copyright. The former refusal is more justifiably subjected to antitrust scrutiny, as
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exception for section 2 analysis of patent holders: if the conduct is
expressly authorized by the79patent laws, then it cannot form the basis for
section 2 antitrust liability.
The Ninth Circuit followed SCM Corp's reasoning in a line of cases
reconciling antitrust with patent and copyright law. In United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second
Circuit that an antitrust violation may not be found where a patent holder
acts in accordance with what the patent laws authorize.8" The Court
favorably cited SCM Corp.8 and refused to impose antitrust liability on a
patent licensing arrangement that was expressly authorized by patent
law. In Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., the Ninth
Circuit again dealt with a similar tension between antitrust and copyright
laws.82 The court affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction in a
copyright infringement action with antitrust counterclaims that involved
a defendant ISO using a plaintiff's copyrighted software to service
machines.83 This case is very similar to MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., where the Ninth Circuit first held that the act of loading
a protected software program into RAM for the purpose of servicing the
computer constitutes infringement.84 It is notable that none of these cases
found conduct expressly authorized by intellectual property laws to
violate the antitrust laws in the absence of further anticompetitive
conduct not sanctioned by intellectual property law. Yet, these cases did
not squarely address the particular issue, which the Ninth Circuit
confronted in Kodak II, of antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to deal
refusals to deal in other forms of property have constituted sufficient anticompetitive conduct to state
a claim in the so-called "essential facilities" cases. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1973) (refusal to sell access to power); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951) (refusal to sell advertising). A refusal to deal in the product protected by
the patent or copyright, however, constitutes exclusionary activity expressly authorized by the
intellectual property statutes, and may more directly conflict with antitrust prohibitions on
monopolization.
79. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1209.
80. 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981). "In advancing its theory... the government argues that an
antitrust violation may be found where a patent holder does precisely that which the patent laws
authorize. The right to license that patent, exclusively or otherwise, or to refuse to license at all, is
'the untrammeled right' of the patentee." Id.
81. Id. at 648 ("[N]o court has ever held that the antitrust laws require a patent holder to forfeit the
exclusionary power inherent in his patent the instant his patent monopoly affords him monopoly
power.") (citations omitted).
82. 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 1337.
84. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
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in products protected by intellectual property. This was partly because
the Supreme Court did not issue its opinion in Kodak I until 1992.
II.

IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC. v. EASTMAN KODAK CO.

Kodak I is best known, of course, for its analysis of firm-specific
antitrust aftermarkets, which altered the landscape of section 2
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims." The closelywatched dispute between several independent service organizations
(ISOs) and Eastman Kodak Company recently ended when the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to the Ninth Circuit in Image Technical Services,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 86 The case lasted eleven years and required a
trip to the Supreme Court to resolve a summary judgment appeal
regarding market definition in aftermarket monopolization cases.87 In the
end, the Ninth Circuit largely affirmed a $71.8 million judgment against
Kodak for monopolizing the service markets for its high volume
photocopier and micrographics equipment.88
A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

Kodak manufactured and sold high-volume photocopiers and
micrographic equipment. In the markets for these durable goods,
competition was robust. s9 Kodak also sold parts for these machines and
serviced them.9" In the early 1980s, ISOs began servicing Kodak
machines, directly competing with Kodak. 91 According to at least some
customers, the ISOs provided better and cheaper service.9" As the ISOs
grew more competitive, Kodak instituted a new parts policy whereby it
refused to sell to ISOs replacement parts it manufactured for its
machines.93 Additionally, Kodak negotiated contracts with its parts

85. See Jennifer E. Gully, Note, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 13
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 339 (1998).
86. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) [Kodak!!], cert. denied, 118S. Ct. 1560 (1998).
87. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
88. Kodak!!. 125 F.3d 1195.
89. Id. at 1200-01.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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suppliers, requiring them not to deal with ISOs. 94 As a result of an
inability to obtain replacement parts for Kodak machines, many ISOs
went out of business or lost service contracts.95 The ISOs claimed that the
market for service of these machines called for annual or multi-year
contracts, which they could not negotiate and execute without a reliable
parts supply.96
In 1987, several ISOs filed suit in the Northern District of California,
seeking damages and injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman
Act. 97 The initial complaint raised both section 1 and section 2 claims. 98

Kodak moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the
motion after some initial discovery.99 The Ninth Circuit reversed,' 0 and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.'' The Court, per Justice
Blackmun, affirmed the Ninth Circuit's denial of summary judgment.'0 2
While much of the Supreme Court's decision dealt with the ISOs'
section 1 claim (which was later dropped on remand), the Court
nevertheless refused to adopt Kodak's proposed rule that a single
aftermarket brand of product or service can never constitute a relevant
market under the Sherman Act when competition in the primary market
is robust.0 3 The Court noted that the proper market definition in this case
could be determined only after a factual inquiry into the "commercial
realities" faced by consumers. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that in
this case the service and parts for Kodak's equipment were not
interchangeable with other manufacturers' service and parts. Therefore,
the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owners' perspective was
composed of only companies that serviced Kodak machines."°4
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1201.
98. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) [Kodak ]. A copy
of the complaint can be found attached to the petitioner's brief to the Supreme Court. See Brief for
Petitioner, Kodak I, 504 U.S. 451 (No. 90-1029). Generally, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits
combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, while section 2 forbids monopolization and
attempted monopolization. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
99. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 WL 156332
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 504 U.S. 451.
100. Image Tech. Servs., 903 F.2d 612.
101. 501 U.S. 1216 (1991).

102. See Kodak!, 504 U.S. at 479.
103. Id. at481-82.
104. Id. at 482.
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On remand, the district court entered judgment on a jury verdict,
awarding $71.8 million in damages (after trebling) to the ISOs and
enjoining Kodak from refusing to sell parts to ISOs at "reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms and prices."'0° Kodak appealed this judgment to
the Ninth Circuit, where for the first time it challenged the jury
instructions on its intellectual property rights. 6 The Ninth Circuit
largely affirmed the judgment of the district court.0 7 In the process,
however, the court recognized the novelty of the issues Kodak raised
regarding the interplay of antitrust and intellectual property laws.'
B.

Kodak II: The Ninth CircuitSolves an IntellectualProperty
Problem with an Antitrust Rule

Having recognized the novelty of the issue and its importance to
intellectual property holders with significant power in markets for parts
of their own durable machines, the Ninth Circuit cautiously attempted to
harmonize facially conflicting antitrust, patent, and copyright laws in
responding to Kodak's challenge. 9 The court restated the broad policies
underlying the three federal statutory schemes"0 and observed that two
principles emerged from the interplay between these laws: (1) patent and
copyright holders are not immune from antitrust liability,"' and
(2) patent and copyright holders may refuse to sell or license protected

105. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201-02, 1227 (9th
Cir. 1997) [KodakIl], cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1560 (1998) (upholding slightly-modified injunction).
106. Apparently, Kodak did not assert its intellectual property rights as a defense to the section 2
claim until the trial. Kodak I addresses Kodak's three proffered business justifications for its
conduct, none of which involve intellectual property in the parts or service of its machines. See
Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 484 (dismissing Kodak's proffered valid business reasons for its refusal to deal,
none of which implicated intellectual property).
107. The court affirmed the damages award for all but one plaintiff ISO, and remanded for a new
trial on used equipment damages. It also modified the injunction. Kodak1, 125 F.3d at 1228.
108. Id. at 1214 (recognizing that significance of monopolist's unilateral refusal to sell or license
patented or copyrighted product in context of section 2 claim is "a question of first impression").
109. Id.
110. Antitrust law seeks to promote and protect a competitive marketplace for the benefit of the
public .... Patent law seeks to protect inventions, while inducing their introduction into the
market for public benefit ....
Federal copyright law "secures a fair return for an author's
creative labor" in the short run, while ultimately seeking "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good."
Id. at 1214-15 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1215.
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work." 2 To support these conclusions, the court cited two lines of cases
regarding the general relationship between antitrust and intellectual
property law. One holds that concerted or contractual action by patent or
copyright holders violates the antitrust laws," 3 while the other suggests
that patent and copyright holders may lawfully refuse to sell or license
their protected work."14
To justify its decision, the Court relied on the now famous footnote
twenty-nine of the Supreme Court's opinion in Kodak I, which suggested
that copyright and patent holders may be subject to antitrust liability
under a monopoly leveraging approach when a seller exploits a
"dominant position in one market to expand [the] empire into the
next."".. This language closely mirrors the language courts use to analyze
patent misuse;" 6 indeed, patent misuse appears to be a concern the
Supreme Court had in mind." 7 The Ninth Circuit interpreted this
language as an endorsement of the broad concept of antitrust liability for
intellectual property holders, and concluded that the mere possession of
valid intellectual property rights does not confer an absolute immunity
from antitrust claims." 8
The court forthrightly confessed, however, that the U.S. Supreme
Court had not addressed the specific question it faced, and furthermore,
no court had ever addressed the question." 9 Before resolving the
question, the court noted that the exclusionary rights granted to patent

112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147. 1185 n.63 (1st
Cir. 1994) (discussing Kodak I and prior cases holding that patent and copyright holders may be
liable for concerted action that violates Sherman Act)).
114. Id. (citing Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 198 1)).
115. Id.at 1216 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29
(1992) [Kodak I]).
116. See supra Part I.C.1.
117. See Kodak 1, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29 (discussing how power gained "through some natural
advantage such as patent, copyright or business acumen" can sometimes give rise to antitrust
liability).
118. Id.
119. The Kodak Court, however, did not specifically address the question of antitrust liability
based upon a unilateral refusal to deal in a patented or copyrighted product. Kodak and its
amicus correctly indicate that the right of exclusive dealing is reserved from antitrust liability.
We find no reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for an unilateral refusal
to sell or license a patent or copyright.
Kodak I, 125 F.3d at 1216 (emphasis added).
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and copyright holders have limits, and that these limits are historically
determined under patent or copyright law rather than antitrust law. 2 '
Finally, the court recognized that while parts and service markets are
separate from the primary equipment market for purposes of antitrust
analysis;' it is a different question altogether whether the exclusionary
rights conferred by the intellectual property laws apply in both the
primary equipment market and the derivative service aftermarkets.'2 2
After expressing its concern for the future of claims based on unilateral
action after this decision,"2 the court proceeded to resolve the question in
a manner that subjected the exclusionary powers of patent and copyright
24
to scrutiny, and ultimately liability, under section 2 of the Sherman Act.'
The court applied a modified version of the rebuttable presumption
test adopted by the First Circuit in Data General Corp. v. Grumman
Systems Support Corp." Under the test, lawful possession of patents or
copyrights constitutes a presumptively valid business justification for
refusing to deal in those products, but this presumption can be overcome
by a showing of pretext. 126 The test applies the default section 2
monopolization analysis to conduct involving intellectual property
rights-property rights that directly authorize what the antitrust analysis
forbids. The court concluded that, while exclusionary conduct can
include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a patent or copyright
or sell its patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist's desire to exclude
others from its protected work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers. 127 Applying this new
test, the court then found that the district court's failure to instruct the
jury on the significance of Kodak's intellectual property rights
constituted an abuse of discretion.' 28

120. Id. at 1216-17.
121. For discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Kodak I, see supra text accompanying
note 103.
122. Kodak!, 125 F.3d at 1217.
123. Id. at 1217-18 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 1218 (adopting presumption of validity for intellectual property-authorized
exclusionary conduct that is rebuttable by showing of pretext).
125. 36 F.3d 1147 (Ist Cir. 1994).
126. Kodak!, 125 F.3d at 1218.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Significantly, however, the court concluded that the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on Kodak's intellectual property rights was
harmless error.'2 9 The court reasoned that, more probably than not, the
jury would have found Kodak's presumptively valid business justification pretextual. 13' According to the court, the decision to call this
harmless error was based not on formalistic distinctions that are
generally disfavored in antitrust law, but on actual market realities.'
The reality on which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied in
determining an issue of fact-that the proffered business justification
was pretextual-was the strong evidence that the intellectual property
a post-hoc pretextual cover for patently illegal
justification was, in fact,
32
exclusionary conduct.
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE KODAK II ANALYSIS
The Ninth CircuitFails to Confront the Extent ofIntellectual
PropertyExclusionaryRights in Multiple Antitrust Markets

A.

Neither the Patent Act nor the Copyright Act limits the right to
33
exercise exclusionary power to a fixed number of antitrust markets.
While the statutes' silence on this question leaves open the possibility
that there is no limit to the number of antitrust markets in which holders
of intellectual property rights may exclude others, the Ninth Circuit in
Kodak II appeared to proceed on the opposite assumption. 34 Without
explicitly stating so, the court operated as if the exclusionary rights
conferred by the patent and copyright laws only authorize their owner to
implement their exclusionary powers in one antitrust market. To its
credit, the court acknowledged the presence of this issue when it framed
the problem with background caselaw.' 35 The court noted that "[p]arts
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1219-20.
131. Id. at 1218.
132. A Kodak employee testified that when deciding to change the parts policy, intellectual
property did not cross his mind. Id. at 1219. Furthermore, only a small fraction of the parts Kodak
refused to sell were patented. Id.
133. See supra I.B.1.
134. This assumption was pointed out and criticized by the one district court that considered and
rejected Kodak 11's analysis. See In re Independent Servs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 113435 (D. Kan. 1997).
135. "We recently noted the distinction between copyright market definition and antitrust market
definition in Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). There,
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and service here have been proven separate markets [from the primary
equipment markets] in the antitrust context, but this does not resolve the
question whether the service market falls reasonably within the patent [or
copyright] grant for the purpose of determining the extent of the
exclusive rights conveyed."' 3 6 This quotation betrays the court's
unspoken assumption that there is a limit to the number of antitrust
markets that can be implicated with a single patent or copyright; the
assumption became evident when the court questioned the "extent" of the
exclusive rights conveyed by patent and copyright law.'37
Not only does this assumption fail to address the Patent and Copyright
Acts' silence on the issue of antitrust markets, it also ignores the
reluctance of other federal courts to impose any restrictions on the patent
or copyright grant beyond what the marketplace dictates. 3 ' In a similar
case pending against Xerox in federal district court in Kansas, the only
court to address this issue since the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II found the
Ninth Circuit's assumption incompatible with prior federal decisions
holding that a patent holder's reward is "unlimited by the law."' 39 Given
the Ninth Circuit's earlier acknowledgment of this issue in the opinion,
its failure to address it, let alone propose a resolution, is disappointing.
The true dispute here, distilled to its core, is whether Kodak could
lawfully exercise its intellectual property exclusionary powers for parts
and softvare in downstream aftermarkets. In adopting its rebuttable
presumption test, the court disposes of the case without reaching this
issue, leaving only the rebuttable presumption test and its pretextualness
rebuttal to resolve similar conflicts in the future.
This leaves future litigants without much practical guidance, as shown
by the rebuttable presumption test's novel reliance on intent to analyze
proffered business justifications in the intellectual property context. As
plaintiff... argued that the copyright of the defendant... did not extend to the service
market. ... We disagreed." Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1217.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Independent Servs., 989 F. Supp. at 1138 ("The rationale of the patent system
mandates that a patent holder's right to exclude cannot be limited by the definition of the relevant
antitrust markets."). While this discussion dealt only with patent rights, the court later applied it by
incorporation to copyrights as well. Id. at 1143-44.
139. Id. at 1138. The court cited several cases to demonstrate this trend: King Instruments Corp.
v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996); United States v.
Studiengesellsehaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981); WL Gore & Assocs., Inc. v.
Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1976); Chisolm-Ryder Co., Inc. v. Mecca Bros., Inc., 217
U.S.P.Q. 1322 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1489 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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discussed above, holders of intellectual property may exercise, or choose
not to exercise, their exclusionary rights irrespective of intent. 4 ° In other
words, the validity of a patent or copyright does not depend on any
beneficent intent, but instead on meeting the statutory criteria for
protection.' 4' Yet, under the Kodak II test, intellectual property is useful
and exclusive only to the extent of one's ability to prove that a refusal to
share it is motivated by "legitimate" or procompetitive, rather than
monopolistic and anticompetitive, goals.
This raises the question whether, after Kodak II, the law treats a
defendant who refuses to deal in intellectual property differently from a
defendant who refuses to deal in anything else. 142 A necessary element of
a prima facie case of monopolization or attempted monopolization is a
showing of an intent to monopolize.'4 3 In the case of a defendant who
refuses to deal in intellectual property protected by the patent or
copyright laws, a plaintiff who has met this element of the initial prima
facie case has likely already rebutted the defendant's "presumptively
valid" business justifications in the process. Even if proof of the conduct
element in the prima facie case does not align with proof that the
proffered business justification is pretextual, the means of deciphering
true intent are unclear. The resulting elusive distinction between
legitimate and pretextual business justifications was one of the primary
reasons the court in In re Independent Service OrganizationsAntitrust
Litigation'4 chose not to adopt the Ninth Circuit's rule:
The standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Kodak makes it
very difficult for a jury, a judge, or even the patent holder, to
distinguish between a permissible refusal to deal (based on a desire
to profit from and protect patent rights) and an impermissible
refusal to deal (apparently based on a desire to obtain a competitive
advantage by excluding competitors). A patent holder does not
140. Supra note 48 and accompanying text.
141. Of course, validly-issued patents and copyrights can be misused, a scenario that will often
coincide with less than noble intentions. But, misuse is tolerated or sanctioned not because of
perceived subjective motivations, but rather because, by the standard criteria of misuse analysis, the
conduct is deemed unacceptable. See supra Part I.C. 1.
142. If not, then the Ninth Circuit has certainly come a long way from Westinghouse and its
rejection of the notion that "an antitrust violation may be found where a patent holder does precisely
that which the patent laws authorize." United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647
(9th Cir. 198 1); see supranote 80 and accompanying text.
143. Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
144. 989 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (1997).
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refuse to share its invention because the property is patented, rather,
the refusal is based on a desire to obtain a competitive
advantage .... The patent is merely the means by which its holder
may obtain this competitive advantage. To classify the desire to
obtain a competitive advantage over competitors as pretext is to
45
read the right to exclude out of the patent statute.
In addition to raising concerns about the practicability of applying a
test based on subjective intent to evaluate the legality of exercising
statutorily-authorized property rights, the test the Ninth Circuit creates
presumes a false dichotomy. The "pretextualness" rebuttal assumes that a
firm that withholds its intellectual property has but one true reason for
doing so, and that the true reason is decipherable. For example, Kodak
claimed at trial that it withheld its parts in an effort to protect its
copyrights and patents; yet, the court found that these proffered business
justifications were pretextual because the restrictive parts policy was not
146
instituted to protect copyrights or patents.
The pretextualness rebuttal, however, is ill-equipped to assess the
exclusionary conduct of a firm that wants to protect its intellectual
property rights and simultaneously wishes to monopolize the market for
the products protected by those rights. The sentiments are not mutually
exclusive, and are likely to be commonly concurrent in firms that invest
in developing intellectual property as a means of increasing market share
and profits. It is unclear whether a firm that refuses to deal for both of
those reasons is cleverly exploiting its intellectual property rights or
foolishly subjecting itself to treble damages liability. The pretextualness
rebuttal cannot appreciate such dual motivations because it causally
ascribes to one intention-however subjectively divined-conduct that
may be inconsistent with and indeed motivated by other potentially
legitimate intentions.
Of course, such guesswork in ascribing one true intention to the
conduct of a firm underlies all analysis of proffered business
justifications insofar as the factfinder must consider the reasonableness
of the proffered justification for the exclusionary conduct and weigh that
against the probability that the justification is pretextual. In disposing of
the facts before it to reach the correct result, however, the Ninth Circuit
145. Id.
146. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 [Kodak II] ("Kodak's
parts manager testified that patents 'did not cross [his] mind' at the time Kodak began the
[exclusionary] parts policy.").
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lowers lawful possession and exercise of intellectual property rights to
the level of a mere consideration to be weighed by the jury as a possible,
albeit presumptively valid, justification for otherwise actionable conduct.
That is to say, whether conduct is protected under the intellectual
property grant is now potentially a question of fact and not law.
Failing to address squarely the nature and extent of Kodak's
exclusionary rights in its intellectual property, the Ninth Circuit instead
implemented a broad rebuttable presumption test to dispose of the case
before it. Unfortunately, the ensuing resort to pretext to limit the
presumptive legality of refusing to deal in products protected by
intellectual property law shifts the inquiry from objective manifestations
of reasonableness to subjective speculation on intent.
B.

The Illusory Rights of Vertically-IntegratedIntellectualProperty
Holders Under the Kodak II Test

Finally, the court's analysis of Kodak's refusals to deal in its patented
parts ignores a fundamental question: If Kodak cannot exclude the
aftermarket competitors from making, using, or selling the covered
invention, then who can it exclude? The parts in Kodak's machines were
not interchangeable with the parts of the machines of any of its
competitors in the primary market for the photocopier and micrographic
equipment.'47 Hence, the universe of potential markets for these parts is
comprised of people who either manufacture, own, or service Kodak
machines.' 48 As no primary market competitor of Kodak has any use for
its patented parts, the only competitors Kodak can conceivably exclude
from using or selling the protected parts are, by necessity, aftermarket
service competitors.'4 9 One presumes that a statutory power to exclude
entails a power to exclude somebody. Under the facts of this case, the
only parties Kodak could realistically exclude are the ISOs. With the
147. Id. at 1200.
148. Of course, there remains the possibility that a competitor will reverse-engineer a Kodak
machine and incorporate the protected product into its own machines. In this case, Kodak would
invoke the right to exclude others from making the part, as opposed to the right to exclude others
from using or selling it. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). This is, of course, a legitimate use of the patent's
exclusionary power, but it was hardly a concern for the Kodak ! court, which faced the question of
section 2 monopolization liability for refusing to deal with aftermarket, not primary market,
competitors. Kodak!!, 125 F.3d at 1200-02.
149. Clearly, Kodak need not fear selling its patented parts to itself for initial manufacture of the
machines for the primary equipment market. The parts are only useful in Kodak machines, which
only Kodak manufactures.
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exception of the owners of the machines, who Kodak obviously does not
wish to alienate, there is no other demand for these parts.
C.

Policy Implicationsfor IntellectualPropertyHolders in a
Post-Kodak II World

The difficulty of applying the new Kodak II test to litigants is not the
only problem the opinion presents. Coupled with Kodak I, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Kodak II presents unique problems for firms that
sell durable goods with replaceable, or even upgradeable, parts that may
be protected by patent or copyright laws.' The holding of Kodak I
makes it more likely that firms will attain monopoly power (perhaps
unwittingly) in the aftermarkets for anything designed and sold specific
to their primary market product, as long as it is not interchangeable or
compatible with competing parts or upgrades for primary market goods.
Because these aftermarkets can be firm-specific, as they were in Kodak I,
the first prong of a section 2 monopolization claim (monopoly power) is
met fairly easily when the same vertically-integrated firm controls output
of both the primary and aftermarket products.' A firm is more likely to
possess high market share in these aftermarkets if it holds intellectual
property rights in the affected products, enabling it to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the protected work.
Finally, Kodak II's weakening of the exclusionary powers of the
intellectual property laws with an intent-based test makes one wonder
whether possession of intellectual property in aftermarket products is an
asset or a liability. The Kodak 11 court claims that the goals of the
antitrust and intellectual property laws are the same,5 2 and even attempts
to characterize its rebuttable presumption test as one that balances the

150. Indeed, the property need not be tangible hardware. Kodak II was one of the first courts to
require a firm to make its copyrighted software available to its competitors. See Kodak 11, 125 F.3d
at 1226 (requiring Kodak to make available to ISOs all "tools or devices essential to servicing Kodak
equipment").
151. In Kodak I, because Kodak controlled distribution of all aftermarket parts (either by
manufacturing them itself or by executing exclusive contracts with its suppliers), a finding of
monopoly power was inevitable once the market was defined in a firm-specific manner. It is
conceivable, however, that a firm may not have such high market share in its own aftermarket goods,
in which case the court would be required to engage in the standard monopoly power analysis to
determine if the firm has the power "to control prices or exclude competition." See United States v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
152. Kodak11, 125 F.3d at 1218 (noting primary interest of both intellectual property and antitrust
law is public interest).

1103

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:1079, 1998

policies behind the conflicting statutory schemes.'5 3 However, the intentbased "test" for recognizing the legitimacy of intellectual property rights
sufficiently weakens the right by allowing the legitimacy of the
exclusionary power to turn on the evidence of "legitimate" intentwhatever that might be.
This weakening of the power conferred by the intellectual property
laws diminishes their incentive power. One of the main policies
underlying both patent and copyright law is to induce public disclosure
of innovation and creativity.' 54 The catalyst for inducing such disclosure
has (at least arguably) been the dangled "carrot" of a temporary period of
exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the protected work, or refrain from
doing so. If this model is accurate, then it is certainly plausible that
patents and copyrights that no longer truly afford their holders exclusive
rights, but instead only bestow "rebuttable presumptions" that
exclusionary conduct is "reasonable," will not constitute quite the
incentives they once did.
The presence and flaws of this test are exacerbated by the realization
that it was unnecessary. Rather than fashion the broad test to dispose of
this case, the Ninth Circuit could have skipped the formulation of the
presumption and its rebuttal and instead imposed section 2 liability on
Kodak for refusing to deal in the unprotected parts alone. Because there
was evidence that access to all parts was necessary for effective
competition, refusing to deal in any parts-protected or otherwise-has
the same effect on the ISOs' practical ability to compete in the service
market. The court could have either refrained from reaching the issue of
the weight to be given intellectual property rights, or held incidentally
that possession of such rights constitutes a defense for refusing to deal in
the products protected thereby, a defense mooted by Kodak's
simultaneous illegal refusal to deal in the majority of unprotected parts.
In either case, the court could have avoided constructing a novel test that
would survive the unique facts of the Kodak dispute and return in future
section 2 cases involving intellectual property. Whether the test will
strike a proper balance between intellectual property rights and antitrust
remains to be seen.

153. "This presumption harmonizes the goals of the relevant statutes and takes into account the
long term effects of regulation on these purposes." Id.
154. Supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because ideas can be so easy to copy and so difficult to produce, the
federal Patent and Copyright Acts grant exclusionary rights of limited
nature and duration in exchange for development and disclosure of
intellectual property. These statutory property rights provide an incentive
for disclosure of new ideas, both useful and artistic. When people obtain
copyrights and patents, they contribute to the public welfare by engaging
in the exchange of ideas. While it is impossible to guess what effect the
absence of these statutes would have on inventive and creative activity,
their purpose in encouraging development and disclosure of ideas is
undermined when the benefits they confer-limited rights to excludeare weakened in a manner that renders the extent and nature of the rights
uncertain. The exact nature of the benefits that society may reap are
unknown, but the intellectual property laws stand for the proposition that
short-term restrictions on free appropriability justify the long-term
benefits of disclosure.
The Sherman Act, meanwhile, forbids monopolization and attempted
monopolization, reflecting the economic judgment that one firm that can
control prices or reduce output constitutes a threat to the economy
sufficient to warrant blanket prohibition. Among the activities that can
constitute exclusionary conduct sufficient to state a monopolization
claim are unilateral refusals to deal. A prima facie section 2 case requires
a showing that intent to monopolize motivates the refusal to deal; this
showing can be rebutted by proffering legitimate business justifications
for the refusal. Determining this question necessarily requires an
evaluation of an alleged monopolist's subjective intent. Liability
therefore turns on intent.
Courts construing unilateral refusal to deal claims have generally
deferred to analysis under intellectual property precedent when
construing an intellectual property right to exclude with an antitrust duty
to deal. This deferral is consistent with the recognition that the short-term
burdens of protection are justified by the long-term benefits of disclosure
and widespread access to ideas. The Ninth Circuit's deviation from this
pattern of deferral is both unnecessary and unwise. It is unnecessary
because legitimate alternative grounds exist for imposing the duty to
deal. It is unwise because it strips the property rights bestowed by the
intellectual property statutes of their luster, jeopardizing the incentives
for disclosure and rendering uncertain the public's continued access to
novel ideas and their derivative benefits. Short-term certainty in
exclusion cannot be obtained by an intellectual property holder whose
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rights to exclude are only as valid as his ability to demonstrate a noble
intention in excluding. This unprecedented emergence of intent as a
condition for the validity of intellectual property rights upsets the
balance struck between the need for new ideas and the need for a
competitive marketplace.
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